Economy of Machine Politics, 4 Corruption and Reform 15, 30

(1989) (reporting that Mayor Daley ``sacked'' a black committee-

man for briefly withholding support for a school board nominee

whom civil rights activists opposed)).

Of course, we have firmly rejected any requirement that ag-

grieved employees ``prove that they, or other employees, have

been coerced into changing, either actually or ostensibly, their

political allegiance.'' Branti, 445 U. S., at 517. What is at

------

issue in these cases is not whether an employee is actually

coerced or merely influenced, but whether the attempt to obtain

his or her support through ``party discipline'' is legitimate.

To apply the relevant question to JUSTICE SCALIA's example, post,

----

at 18, the person who attempts to bribe a public official is

guilty of a crime regardless whether the official submits to

temptation; likewise, a political party's attempt to maintain

loyalty through allocation of government resources is improper

regardless whether any employee capitulates.

More importantly, it rests on the long-rejected fallacy that a

privilege may be burdened by unconstitutional conditions. See,

e. g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 597 (1972). There are

- - ----- ----------

a few jobs for which an individual's race or religion may be

relevant, see Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U. S.

------ ------- ----- -- ---------

267, 314-315 (1986) (dissenting opinion); there are many jobs for

which political affiliation is relevant to the employee's ability

to function effectively as part of a given administration. In

those cases--in other words, cases in which ``the efficiency of

the public service,'' Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75,

------ ------- --------

101 (1947), would be advanced by hiring workers who are loyal to

the Governor's party--such hiring is permissible under the hold-

ings in Elrod and Branti. This case, however, concerns jobs in

----- ------

which race, religion, and political affiliation are all equally

and entirely irrelevant to the public service to be performed.

When an individual has been denied employment for an impermissi-

ble reason, it is unacceptable to balance the constitutional

rights of the individual against the political interests of the

party in power. It seems to me obvious that the government may

not discriminate against particular individuals in hopes of ad-

vancing partisan interests through the misuse

of public funds.

The only systemic consideration permissible in these cir-

cumstances is not that of the controlling party, but that of the

aggregate of burdened individuals. By impairing individuals'

freedoms of belief and association, unfettered patronage prac-

tices undermine the ``free functioning of the electoral pro-

cess.'' Elrod, 427 U. S., at 356. As I wrote in 1972:

-----

Indeed, when numbers are considered, it is appropriate not

merely to consider the rights of a particular janitor who may

have been offered a bribe from the public treasury to obtain

his political surrender, but also the impact on the body poli-

tic as a whole when the free political choice of millions of

public servants is inhibited or manipulated by the selective

award of public benefits. While the patronage system is de-

fended in the name of democratic tradition, its paternalistic

impact on the political process is actually at war with the

deeper traditions of democracy embodied in the First Amend-

ment.'' Lewis, 473 F. 2d, at 576.

-----

The tradition that is relevant in this case is the American

commitment to examine and reexamine past and present practices

against the basic principles embodied in the Constitution. The

inspirational command by our President in 1961 is entirely con-

sistent with that tradition: ``Ask not what your country can do

for you--ask what you can do for your country.'' This case in-

volves a contrary command: ``Ask not what job applicants can do

for the State--ask what they can do for our party.'' Whatever

traditional support may remain for a command of that ilk, it is

plainly an illegitimate excuse for the practices rejected by

the Court today.

JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE KENNEDY

join, and with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR joins as to Parts II and

III, dissenting.

--

Today the Court establishes the constitutional principle that

party membership is not a permissible factor in the dispensation

of government jobs, except those jobs for the performance of

which party affiliation is an ``appropriate requirement.'' Ante,

----

at 1. It is hard to say precisely (or even generally) what that

exception means, but if there is any category of jobs for whose

performance party affiliation is not an appropriate requirement,

it is the job of being a judge, where partisanship is not only

unneeded but positively undesirable. It is, however, rare that a

federal administration of one party will appoint a judge from

another party. And it has always been rare. See Marbury v.

-------

Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803). Thus, the new principle that the

-------

Court today announces will be enforced by a corps of judges (the

Members of this Court included) who overwhelmingly owe their of-

fice to its violation. Something must be wrong here, and I sug-

gest it is the Court.

The merit principle for government employment is probably the

most favored in modern America, having been widely adopted by

civil-service legislation at both the state and federal levels.

But there is another point of view, described in characteristi-

cally Jacksonian fashion by an eminent practitioner of the pa-

tronage system, George Washington Plunkitt of Tammany Hall:

``I ain't up on sillygisms, but I can give you some arguments

that nobody can answer.

``First, this great and glorious country was built up by pol-

itical parties; second, parties can't hold together if their

workers don't get offices when they win; third, if the parties

go to pieces, the government they built up must go to pieces,

too; fourth, then there'll be hell to pay.'' W. Riordon, Plunk-

itt of Tammany Hall 13 (1963).

It may well be that the Good Government Leagues of America were

right, and that Plunkitt, James Michael Curley and their ilk were

wrong; but that is not entirely certain. As the merit principle

has been extended and its effects increasingly felt; as the Boss

Tweeds, the Tammany Halls, the Pendergast Machines, the Byrd

Machines and the Daley Machines have faded into history; we find

that political leaders at all levels increasingly complain of the

helplessness of elected government, unprotected by ``party dis-

cipline,'' before the demands of small and cohesive interest-

groups.

The choice between patronage and the merit principle--or, to be

more realistic about it, the choice between the desirable mix of

merit and patronage principles in widely varying federal, state,

and local political contexts--is not so clear that I would be

prepared, as an original matter, to chisel a single, inflexible

prescription into the Constitution. Fourteen years ago, in Elrod

-----

v. Burns, 427 U. S. 347 (1976), the Court did that. Elrod was

----- -----

limited however, as was the later decision of Branti v. Finkel,

------ ------

445 U. S. 507 (1980), to patronage firings, leaving it to state

and federal legislatures to determine when and where political

affiliation could be taken into account in hirings and promo-

tions. Today the Court makes its constitutional civil-service

reform absolute, extending to all decisions regarding government

employment. Because the First Amendment has never been thought

to require this disposition, which may well have disastrous

consequences for our political system, I dissent.

I

The restrictions that the Constitution places upon the govern-

ment in its capacity as lawmaker, i. e., as the regulator of

- -

private conduct, are not the same as the restrictions that it

places upon the government in its capacity as employer. We have

recognized this in many contexts, with respect to many different

constitutional guarantees. Private citizens perhaps cannot be

prevented from wearing long hair, but policemen can. Kelley v.

------

Johnson, 425 U. S. 238, 247 (1976). Private citizens cannot have

-------

their property searched without probable cause, but in many cir-

cumstances government employees can. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480

- ------ ------

U. S. 709, 723 (1987) (plurality opinion); id., at 732 (SCALIA,

--

J., concurring in judgment). Private citizens cannot be punished

for refusing to provide the government information that may in-

criminate them, but government employees can be dismissed when

the incriminating information that they refuse to provide relates

to the performance of their job. Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U. S.

------- ---------

273, 277-278 (1968). With regard to freedom of speech in partic-

ular: Private citizens cannot be punished for speech of merely

private concern, but government employees can be fired for that

reason. Connick v. Myers, 461 U. S. 138, 147 (1983). Private

------- -----

citizens cannot be punished for partisan political activity, but

federal and state employees can be dismissed and otherwise pun-

ished for that reason. Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75,

------ ------- --------

101 (1947); CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 556 (1973);

--- ------ --------

Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 616-617 (1973).

--------- --------

Once it is acknowledged that the Constitution's prohibition

against laws ``abridging the freedom of speech'' does not apply

to laws enacted in the government's capacity as employer the same

way it does to laws enacted in the government's capacity as regu-

lator of private conduct, it may sometimes be difficult to assess

what employment practices are permissible and what are not. That

seems to me not a difficult question, however, in the present

context. The provisions of the Bill of Rights were designed to

restrain transient majorities from impairing long-recognized per-

sonal liberties. They did not create by implication novel indi-

vidual rights overturning accepted political norms. Thus, when a

practice not expressly prohibited by the text of the Bill of

Rights bears the endorsement of a long tradition of open,

widespread, and unchallenged use that dates back to the beginning

of the Republic, we have no proper basis for striking it down.

Such a venerable and accepted tradition is not to be laid on the

examining table and scrutinized for its conformity to some

abstract principle of First-Amendment adjudication devised by

this Court. To the contrary, such traditions are themselves the

stuff out of which the Court's principles are to be formed. They

are, in these uncertain areas, the very points of reference by

which the legitimacy or illegitimacy of other practices are to be

-----

figured out. When it appears that the latest ``rule,'' or

``three-part test,'' or ``balancing test'' devised by the Court

has placed us on a collision course with such a landmark prac-

tice, it is the former that must be recalculated by us, and not

the latter that must be abandoned by our citizens. I know of no

other way to formulate a constitutional jurisprudence that re-

flects, as it should, the principles adhered to, over time, by

the American people, rather than those favored by the personal

(and necessarily shifting) philosophical dispositions of a major-

ity of this Court.

I will not describe at length the claim of patronage to landmark

status as one of our accepted political traditions. Justice

Powell discussed it in his dissenting opinions in Elrod and Bran-

----- -----

ti. Elrod, 427 U. S., at 378-379 (Powell, J., dissenting); Bran-

-- ----- -----

ti, 445 U. S., at 522, n. 1 (Powell, J., dissenting). Suffice it

--

to say that patronage was, without any thought that it could be

unconstitutional, a basis for government employment from the ear-

liest days of the Republic until Elrod--and has continued unabat-

-----

ed since Elrod, to the extent still permitted by that unfortunate

----- -----

decision. See, e. g., D. Price, Bringing Back the Parties 24, 32

- -

(1984); Gardner, A Theory of the Spoils System, 54 Public Choice

171, 181 (1987); Toinet & Glenn, Clientelism and Corruption in

the ``Open'' Society: The Case of the United States, in Private

Patronage and Public Power 193, 202 (C. Clapham ed. 1982). Given

that unbroken tradition regarding the application of an ambiguous

constitutional text, there was in my view no basis for holding

that patronage-based dismissals violated the First

Amendment--much less for holding, as the Court does today, that

even patronage hiring does so.

II

Even accepting the Court's own mode of analysis, however, and

engaging in ``balancing'' a tradition that ought to be part of

the scales, Elrod, Branti, and today's extension of them seem to

----- ------

me wrong.

A

The Court limits patronage on the ground that the individual's

interest in uncoerced belief and expression outweighs the system-

ic interests invoked to justify the practice. Ante, at 5-9. The

----

opinion indicates that the government may prevail only if it

proves that the practice is ``narrowly tailored to further vital

government interests.'' Ante, at 10-11.

----

That strict-scrutiny standard finds no support in our cases.

Although our decisions establish that government employees do not

lose all constitutional rights, we have consistently applied a

lower level of scrutiny when ``the governmental function operat-

ing . . . [is] not the power to regulate or license, as lawmaker,

an entire trade or profession, or to control an entire branch of

private business, but, rather, as proprietor, to manage [its]

internal operatio[ns] . . . .'' Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v.

--------- ---------- -------

McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 896 (1961). When dealing with its own

-------

employees, the government may not act in a manner that is ``pa-

tently arbitrary or discriminatory,'' id., at 898, but its regu-

--

lations are valid if they bear a ``rational connection'' to the

governmental end sought to be served, Kelley v. Johnson, 425

------ -------

U. S., at 247.

In particular, restrictions on speech by public employees are

not judged by the test applicable to similar restrictions on

speech by nonemployees. We have said that ``[a] governmental em-

ployer may subject its employees to such special restrictions on

free expression as are reasonably necessary to promote effective

government.'' Brown v. Glines, 444 U. S. 348, 356, n. 13 (1980).

----- ------

In Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S., at 101, upholding pro-

------ ------- --------

visions of the Hatch Act which prohibit political activities by

federal employees, we said that ``it is not necessary that the

act regulated be anything more than an act reasonably deemed by

Congress to interfere with the efficiency of the public ser-

vice.'' We reaffirmed Mitchell in CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413

-------- --- ------ --------

U. S., at 556, over a dissent by Justice Douglas arguing against

application of a special standard to government employees, except

insofar as their ``job performance'' is concerned, id., at 597.

--

We did not say that the Hatch Act was narrowly tailored to meet

the government's interest, but merely deferred to the judgment of

Congress, which we were not ``in any position to dispute.'' Id.,

--

at 567. Indeed, we recognized that the Act was not indispensably

necessary to achieve those ends, since we repeatedly noted that

``Congress at some time [may] come to a different view.'' Ibid.,

----

see also id., at 555, 564. In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S.

-- --------- --------

601 (1973), we upheld similar restrictions on state employees,

though directed ``at political expression which if engaged in by

private persons would plainly be protected by the First and Four-

teenth Amendments,'' Id., at 616.

--

To the same effect are cases that specifically concern adverse

employment action taken against public employees because of their

speech. In Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High

--------- ----- -- --------- -- -------- ----

School Dist., 391 U. S. 563, 568 (1968), we recognized:

------ ----

[T]he State has interests as an employer in regulating the

speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it

possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the

citizenry in general. The problem in any case is to arrive at

a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a ci-

tizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the in-

terests of the State, as an employer, in promoting the effi-

ciency of the public services it performs through its employ-

ees.''

Because the restriction on speech is more attenuated when the

government conditions employment than when it imposes criminal

penalties, and because ``government offices could not function if

every employment decision became a constitutional matter,'' Con-

----

nick v. Myers, 461 U. S., at 143, we have held that government

---- -----

employment decisions taken on the basis of an employee's speech

do not ``abridg[e] the freedom of speech,'' U. S. Const., Amdt.

1, merely because they fail the narrow-tailoring and compelling-

interest tests applicable to direct regulation of speech. We

have not subjected such decisions to strict scrutiny, but have

accorded ``a wide degree of deference to the employer's judg-

ment'' that an employee's speech will interfere with close work-

ing relationships. 461 U. S., at 152.

When the government takes adverse action against an employee on

the basis of his political affiliation (an interest whose consti-

tutional protection is derived from the interest in speech), the

same analysis applies. That is why both the Elrod plurality, 427

-----

U. S., at 359, and the opinion concurring in the judgment, id.,

--

at 375, as well as Branti, 445 U. S., at 514-515, and the Court

------

today, ante, at 8-9, rely on Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593

---- ----- ----------

(1972), a case that applied the test announced in Pickering, not

---------

the strict-scrutiny test applied to restrictions imposed on the

public at large. Since the government may dismiss an employee

for political speech ``reasonably deemed by Congress to interfere

------

with the efficiency of the public service,'' Public Workers v.

------ -------

Mitchell, supra, at 101, it follows a fortiori that the govern-

-------- ----- - --------

ment may dismiss an employee for political affiliation if ``rea-

-----------

sonably necessary to promote effective government.'' Brown v.

-----

Glines, supra, at 356, n. 13.

------ -----

While it is clear from the above cases that the normal ``strict

scrutiny'' that we accord to government regulation of speech is

not applicable in this field,

phasis added). This suggestion is incorrect, does not aid the

Court's argument, and if accepted would eviscerate the strict-

scrutiny standard. It is incorrect because even a casual perusal

of the cases reveals that the governmental actions were sus-

tained, not because they were shown to be ``narrowly tailored to

further vital government interests,'' ante, at 10-11, but because

----

they were ``reasonably'' deemed necessary to promote effective

government. It does not aid the Court's argument, moreover, be-

cause whatever standard those cases applied must be applied here,

--------

and if the asserted interests in patronage are as weighty as

those proffered in the previous cases, then Elrod and Branti were

----- ------

wrongly decided. It eviscerates the standard, finally, because

if the practices upheld in those cases survived strict scrutiny,

then the so-called ``strict scrutiny'' test means nothing. Sup-

pose a State made it unlawful for an employee of a privately

owned nuclear power plant to criticize his employer. Can there

be any doubt that we would reject out of hand the State's argu-

ment that the statute was justified by the compelling interest in

maintaining the appearance that such employees are operating nu-

clear plants properly, so as to maintain public confidence in the

plants' safety? But cf. CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548,

--- ------ --------

565 (1973) (Hatch Act justified by need for government employees

to ``appear to the public to be avoiding [political partiality],

if confidence in the system of representative Government is not

to be eroded''). Suppose again that a State prohibited a private

employee from speaking on the job about matters of private con-

cern. Would we even hesitate before dismissing the State's claim

that the compelling interest in fostering an efficient economy

overrides the individual's interest in speaking on such matters?

But cf. Connick v. Myers, 461 U. S. 138, 147 (1983) (``[W]hen a

------- -----

public employee speaks . . . upon matters only of personal in-

terest, absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal court is

not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a per-

sonnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to

the employee's behavior''). If the Court thinks that strict

scrutiny is appropriate in all these cases, then it should

forthrightly admit that Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75

------ ------- --------

(1947), Letter Carriers, Pickering v. Board of Education of Town-

------ -------- --------- ----- -- --------- -- ----

ship High School Dist., 391 U. S. 563 (1968), Connick, and simi-

---- ---- ------ ---- -------

lar cases were mistaken and should be overruled; if it rejects

that course, then it should admit that those cases applied, as

they said they did, a reasonableness test.

The Court's further contention that these cases are limited to

the ``interests that the government has in its capacity as an em-

ployer,'' ante, at 7, n. 4, as distinct from its interests ``in

----

the structure and functioning of society as a whole,'' ibid., is

----

neither true nor relevant. Surely a principal reason for the

statutes that we have upheld preventing political activity by

government employees--and indeed the only substantial reason,

----

with respect to those employees who are permitted to be hired and

fired on a political basis--is to prevent the party in power from

obtaining what is considered an unfair advantage in political

campaigns. That is precisely the type of governmental interest

at issue here. But even if the Court were correct, I see no rea-

son in policy or principle why the government would be limited to

furthering only its interests ``as employer.'' In fact, we have

----

seemingly approved the furtherance of broader governmental in-

terests through employment restrictions. In Hampton v. Mow Sun

------- --- ---

Wong, 426 U. S. 88 (1976), we held unlawful a Civil Service Com-

----

mission regulation prohibiting the hiring of aliens on the ground

that the Commission lacked the requisite authority. We were wil-

ling, however, to ``assume . . . that if the Congress or the

President had expressly imposed the citizenship requirement, it

would be justified by the national interest in providing an in-

centive for aliens to become naturalized, or possibly even as

providing the President with an expendable token for treaty nego-

tiating purposes.'' Id., at 105. Three months after our opinion,

--

the President adopted the restriction by Executive Order. Exec.

Order No. 11935, 3 CFR 146 (1976 Comp.). On remand, the lower

courts denied the Mow Sun Wong plaintiffs relief, on the basis of

--- --- ----

this new Executive Order and relying upon the interest in provid-

ing an incentive for citizenship. Mow SunWong v. Hampton, 435 F.

--- ------- -------

Supp. 37 (ND Cal. 1977), aff'd, 626 F. 2d 739 (CA9 1980). We

denied certiorari, sub nom. Lum v. Campbell, 450 U. S. 959

--- --- --- --------

(1981). In other cases, the lower federal courts have uniformly

reached the same result. See, e. g., Jalil v. Campbell, 192

- - ----- --------

U. S. App. D. C. 4, 7, 590 F. 2d 1120, 1123, n. 3 (1978); Vergara

-------

v. Hampton, 581 F. 2d 1281 (CA7 1978), cert. denied, 441 U. S.

-------

905 (1979); Santin Ramos v. United States Civil Service Comm'n,

------ ----- ------ ------ ----- ------- ---- -

430 F. Supp. 422 (PR 1977) (three-judge court).

the precise test that replaces it is not so clear; we have used

various formulations. The one that appears in the case dealing

with an employment practice closest in its effects to patronage

is whether the practice could be ``reasonably deemed'' by the

enacting legislature to further a legitimate goal. Public Work-

------ -----

ers v. Mitchell, supra, at 101. For purposes of my ensuing dis-

--- -------- -----

cussion, however, I will apply a less permissive standard that

seems more in accord with our general ``balancing'' test: can the

governmental advantages of this employment practice reasonably be

deemed to outweigh its ``coercive'' effects?

B

Preliminarily, I may observe that the Court today not only de-

clines, in this area replete with constitutional ambiguities, to

give the clear and continuing tradition of our people the dispo-

------

sitive effect I think it deserves, but even declines to give it

------

substantial weight in the balancing. That is contrary to what

the Court has done in many other contexts. In evaluating so-

called ``substantive due process'' claims we have examined our

history and tradition with respect to the asserted right. See,

e. g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U. S. ---- (1989); Bowers v.

- - ------- - ------ - ------

Hardwick, 478 U. S. 186, 192-194 (1986). In evaluating claims

--------

that a particular procedure violates the Due Process Clause we

have asked whether the procedure is traditional. See, e. g.,

- -

Burnham v. Superior Court of California, Marin County, 495 U. S.

------- -------- ----- -- ---------- ----- ------

---- (1990). And in applying the Fourth Amendment's reasonable-

ness test we have looked to the history of judicial and public

acceptance of the type of search in question. See, e. g., Camara

- - ------

v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U. S. 523, 537 (1967).

--------- ----- -- --- ---------

See also Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California,

----- ---------- -- -------- ----- -- ----------

Riverside County, 478 U. S. 1, 8 (1986) (tradition of accessibil-

--------- ------

ity to judicial proceedings implies judgment of experience that

individual's interest in access outweighs government's interest

in closure); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U. S.

-------- ---------- --- --------

555, 589 (1980) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment) (``Such a

tradition [of public access] commands respect in part because the

Constitution carries the gloss of history''); Walz v. Tax Comm'n

---- --- ---- -

of New York, 397 U. S. 664, 678 (1970) (``unbroken practice of

-- --- ----

according the [property tax] exemption to churches'' demonstrates

that it does not violate Establishment Clause).

But even laying tradition entirely aside, it seems to me our

balancing test is amply met. I assume, as the Court's opinion

assumes, that the balancing is to be done on a generalized basis,

and not case-by-case. The Court holds that the governmental

benefits of patronage cannot reasonably be thought to outweigh

its ``coercive'' effects (even the lesser ``coercive'' effects of

patronage hiring as opposed to patronage firing) not merely in

1990 in the State of Illinois, but at any time in any of the

numerous political subdivisions of this vast country. It seems

to me that that categorical pronouncement reflects a naive vision

of politics and an inadequate appreciation of the systemic ef-

fects of patronage in promoting political stability and facili-

tating the social and political integration of previously power-

less groups.

The whole point of my dissent is that the desirability of pa-

tronage is a policy question to be decided by the people's

representatives; I do not mean, therefore, to endorse that sys-

tem. But in order to demonstrate that a legislature could rea-

sonably determine that its benefits outweigh its ``coercive'' ef-

fects, I must describe those benefits as the proponents of pa-

tronage see them: As Justice Powell discussed at length in his

Elrod dissent, patronage stabilizes political parties and

-----

prevents excessive political fragmentation--both of which are

results in which States have a strong governmental interest.

Party strength requires the efforts of the rank-and-file, espe-

cially in ``the dull periods between elections,'' to perform such

tasks as organizing precincts, registering new voters, and pro-

viding constituent services. Elrod, 427 U. S., at 385 (dissent-

-----

ing opinion). Even the most enthusiastic supporter of a party's

program will shrink before such drudgery, and it is folly to

think that ideological conviction alone will motivate sufficient

numbers to keep the party going through the off-years. ``For the

most part, as every politician knows, the hope of some reward

generates a major portion of the local political activity sup-

porting parties.'' Ibid. Here is the judgment of one such poli-

----

tician, Jacob Arvey (best known as the promoter of Adlai Steven-

son): Patronage is `` `a necessary evil if you want a strong or-

ganization, because the patronage system permits of discipline,

and without discipline, there's no party organization.' '' Quoted

in M. Tolchin & S. Tolchin, To the Victor 36 (1971). A major

study of the patronage system describes the reality as follows:

[A]lthough men have many motives for entering political life

. . . the vast underpinning of both major parties is made up of

men who seek practical rewards. Tangible advantages constitute

the unifying thread of most successful political practition-

ers'' Id., at 22.

--

``With so little patronage cement, party discipline is rela-

tively low; the rate of participation and amount of service the

party can extract from [Montclair] county committeemen are

minuscule compared with Cook County. The party considers it-

self lucky if 50 percent of its committeemen show up at

meetings--even those labeled `urgent'--while even lower percen-

tages turn out at functions intended to produce crowds for

visiting candidates.'' Id., at 123.

--

See also W. Grimshaw, The Political Economy of Machine Politics,

4 Corruption and Reform 15, 30 (1989); G. Pomper, Voters, Elec-

tions, and Parties 255 (1988); Wolfinger, Why Political Machines

Have Not Withered Away and Other Revisionist Thoughts, 34 J. Pol-

itics 365, 384 (1972).

The Court simply refuses to acknowledge the link between pa-

tronage and party discipline, and between that and party success.

It relies (as did the plurality in Elrod, 427 U. S., at 369,

-----

n. 23) on a single study of a rural Pennsylvania county by Pro-

fessor Sorauf, ante, at 13--a work that has been described as

----

``more persuasive about the ineffectuality of Democratic leaders

in Centre County than about the generalizability of [its] find-

ings.'' Wolfinger, supra, at 384, n. 39. It is unpersuasive to

-----

claim, as the Court does, that party workers are obsolete because

campaigns are now conducted through media and other money-

intensive means. Ante, at 13. Those techniques have supplement-

----

ed but not supplanted personal contacts. See Price, Bringing

Back the Parties, at 25. Certainly they have not made personal

contacts unnecessary in campaigns for the lower-level offices

that are the foundations of party strength, nor have they re-

placed the myriad functions performed by party regulars not

directly related to campaigning. And to the extent such tech-

niques have replaced older methods of campaigning (partly in

response to the limitations the Court has placed on patronage),

the political system is not clearly better off. See Elrod,

-----

supra, at 384 (Powell, J., dissenting); Branti, 445 U. S., at 528

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(Powell, J., dissenting). Increased reliance on money-intensive

campaign techniques tends to entrench those in power much more

effectively than patronage--but without the attendant benefit of

strengthening the party system. A challenger can more easily ob-

tain the support of party-workers (who can expect to be rewarded

even if the candidate loses--if not this year, then the next)

than the financial support of political action committees (which

will generally support incumbents, who are likely to prevail).

It is self-evident that eliminating patronage will significantly

undermine party discipline; and that as party discipline wanes,

so will the strength of the two-party system. But, says the

Court, ``[p]olitical parties have already survived the substan-

tial decline in patronage employment practices in this century.''

Ante, at 12-13. This is almost verbatim what was said in Elrod,

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see 427 U. S., at 369. Fourteen years later it seems much less

convincing. Indeed, now that we have witnessed, in 18 of the

last 22 years, an Executive Branch of the Federal Government

under the control of one party while the Congress is entirely or

(for two years) partially within the control of the other party;

now that we have undergone the most recent federal election, in

which 98% of the incumbents, of whatever party, were returned to

office; and now that we have seen elected officials changing

their political affiliation with unprecedented readiness, Wash-

ington Post, Apr. 10, 1990, p. A1, the statement that ``political

parties have already survived'' has a positively whistling-in-

the-graveyard character to it. Parties have assuredly

survived--but as what? As the forges upon which many of the

essential compromises of American political life are hammered

out? Or merely as convenient vehicles for the conducting of na-

tional presidential elections?

The patronage system does not, of course, merely foster politi-

cal parties in general; it fosters the two-party system in par-

ticular. When getting a job, as opposed to effectuating a par-

ticular substantive policy, is an available incentive for party-

workers, those attracted by that incentive are likely to work for

the party that has the best chance of displacing the ``ins,''

rather than for some splinter group that has a more attractive

political philosophy but little hope of success. Not only is a

two-party system more likely to emerge, but the differences

between those parties are more likely to be moderated, as each

has a relatively greater interest in appealing to a majority of

the electorate and a relatively lesser interest in furthering

philosophies or programs that are far from the mainstream. The

stabilizing effects of such a system are obvious. See Toinet &

Glenn, Clientelism and Corruption in the ``Open'' Society, at

208. In the context of electoral laws we have approved the

States' pursuit of such stability, and their avoidance of the

``splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism [that] may do

significant damage to the fabric of government.'' Storer v.

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Brown, 415 U. S. 724, 736 (1974) (upholding law disqualifying

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persons from running as independents if affiliated with a party

in the past year).

Equally apparent is the relatively destabilizing nature of a

system in which candidates cannot rely upon patronage-based party

loyalty for their campaign support, but must attract workers and

raise funds by appealing to various interest-groups. See Tolchin

& Tolchin, To the Victor, at 127-130. There is little doubt that

our decisions in Elrod and Branti, by contributing to the decline

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of party strength, have also contributed to the growth of

interest-group politics in the last decade. See, e. g., Fitts,

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The Vice of Virtue, 136 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1567, 1603-1607 (1988).

Our decision today will greatly accelerate the trend. It is not

only campaigns that are affected, of course, but the subsequent

behavior of politicians once they are in power. The replacement

of a system firmly based in party discipline with one in which

each office-holder comes to his own accommodation with competing

interest groups produces ``a dispersion of political influence

that may inhibit a political party from enacting its programs

into law.'' Branti, supra, at 531 (Powell, J., dissenting).

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